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564 LOWE v. STATE BAR [40 C.2d 
fornia some of its richest production has been achieved br 
tapping the deeper sands after shallower production had been 
largely exhausted. It seems difficult to conceive of a more 
useless, unnecessary and wholly arbitrary "regulation" than 
that involved herein, which while permitting the drilling for, 
and the production of, oil on plaintiff's property limits the> 
drilling and production to preexisting depths. 
T would reverse the judgment. 
[L. A. No. 22434. In Bank. Mar. 27, 1953.] 
IRWIN M. LOWE, Petitioner, v. STATE BAR OF CALI-
FORNIA, Respondent. 
[1] Attorneys-Disciplinary Proceedings- Hearing- Findings.-
Where an attorney is charged with having made a false state-
ment under oath in court with reference to money held by him 
for purchase of a minor's interest in an estate, findings of 
local administrative committee and Board of Governors of 
State Bar that when he made such statement he mistakenly 
believed the court desired to know whether he had in his 
possession, or had ever had, any funds of such estate or of 
such minor, and that the information which he then intended 
to state to the court was true, amounts to a finding of an in-
correct statement made without intent to deceive, and properly 
should be considered as a vindication of misconduct charged 
in connection therewith. 
[2] !d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Violation of Oath and Duties 
as Attorney.-Gross negligence of an attorney is a breach of 
the fiduciary relationship that binds the attorney to the most 
conscientious fidelity to the interests of his client; it warrants 
disciplinary action, since it is a violation of his oath to dis-
charge his duties to the best of his knowledge and ability. 
(Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 6067, 6103.) 
[3] !d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Hearing- Evidence.-Conclu-
sion of local administrative committee and Board of Governors 
of State Bar that accused attorney's conduct in overdrawing a 
trust account constituted more than negligence and carelessness 
on his part and that he was guilty of professional misconduct 
is justified by evidence that a check for $750 was delivered 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, §§ 65, 68; Am.Jur., At-
torneys at Law, § 261 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3] Attorneys,§ 172(9); [2] Attorneys, 
§ 137; [4] Attorneys,§ 139; [5] Attorneys, § 174. 
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to him to be used for the purchase of a minor's interest in an 
estate, that during his negotiations with the minor's representa-
tives, which continued for more than three years after de-
positing the proceeds of such check in his trust account, there 
were many deposits in and withdrawals from such account, 
that on numerous occasions the account fell below $750 and 
in some instances it was completely overdrawn, that he con-
tinued to make overdrafts against it after he was informed 
by the bank that the account was overdrawn, that he was 
unable to explain why the account was depleted below $750, 
and that he did not employ a bookkeeping system which would 
show a balance of funds he held in trust. 
[ 4] !d.-Disciplinary Proceedings- Misconduct Toward Court.-
Untrue statement made by attorney to court that there had 
always been in excess of $750 in his trust account subsequent 
to time of deposit of that sum therein, which was more than 
three years previously, constitutes professional misconduct in 
violation of Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068 (d), if made with intent 
to deceive the court, although the accounting proceeding then 
before the court had nothing to do with the condition of the 
attorney's trust account and it is doubtful whether his state-
ment had an influence on the court's action in that pro-
ceeding. 
[5] Id.- Disciplinary Proceedings- Review- Punishment.- Al-
though evidence supports findings of local administrative com-
mittee and Board of Governors of State Bar that accused at-
torney was guilty of professional misconduct in wilfully and 
knowingly causing trust funds to be withdrawn from a trust 
account and to be used for purposes other than those for which 
they were entrusted to him, without the knowledge or con-
sent of his clients, and also in making false statements in 
court in regard to such trust account, where it appears that 
he had no intention of defrauding his clients, the Supreme 
Court will suspend him from the practice of law for two years, 
as recommended by the local administrative committee, and 
not disbar him, as recommended by the Board of Governors. 
PROCEEDING to review a recommendation of disbarment 
of an attorney. Petitioner suspended for two years. 
,John W. Preston for Petitioner. 
Richard C. Heaton and Jerold E. Weil for Respondent. 
THE COURT.-The petitioner, Irwin M. Lowe, seeks a 
review of a recommendation of the Board of Governors of 
The State Bar that he be disbarred from the practice of the 
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law. The Board of Governors approved and adopted :find-
ings of fact of a local administrative committee, which on 
these findings had recommended that the petitioner be sus-
pended from the practice of law for a period of two years. 
The events leading up to this proceeding against the peti-
tioner began in July, 1948. For several years prior to that 
time he had represented Joe Diaz and Pilar Vargas in their 
legal matters. The two were brothers-in-law and partners 
in a restaurant business. They were of Mexican extraction 
and were uneducated. They had difficulty in understanding 
the English language and the legal aspects of business trans-
actions. In July, 1948, they delivered to the petitioner a 
check for $750 made payable to him with instructions that 
it was to be used for the purchase of the interest of a minor 
nephew of Pilar Vargas in the estate of Refugio Vargas, the 
deceased father of Pilar and grandfather of the minor. The 
petitioner promptly deposited the proceeds of the check in 
his trust account in the Oxnard Branch of the Security-First 
National Bank of Los Angeles. He thereafter entered into 
negotiations with the proper representatives of the minor for 
the purchase of the latter's interest in the estate which con-
sisted entirely of real property. The parties were unable 
to agree upon a satisfactory price. During the period of 
negotiations they found that there was a cloud on the title. 
They were unable to agree upon who should bear the costs 
of approximately $250 necessary to clear title. The peti-
tioner failed to reach an agreement with the representatives 
of the minor, although negotiations continued for more than 
three years. 
During the period of negotiations there were a great many 
deposits in and withdrawals from the petitioner's trust ac-
count. The balance varied over a wide range, and on numer-
ous occasions it fell below $750, the amount entrusted to 
the petitioner by his clients. The petitioner's bank state-
ment shows that in many instances checks were charged 
against the trust account leaving balances of less than $750, 
and in some of these instances the account was completely 
overdrawn. The petitioner admits that he was promptly 
informed of these overdrawals. A bank official testified that 
upon notification, of an overdrawal the petitioner was always 
prompt in replenishing the account. The findings of fact 
recite that the petitioner "Wilfully and knowingly caused 
said trust funds to be withdrawn from said trust account 
and to be used for purposes other than those for which they 
Mar. 1953) LowE v. STATE BAR 
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were entrusted to respondent, without the knowledge or con-
sent of respondent's said clients." Upon the admitted facts 
this finding cannot rightfully be controverted but the fur-
ther finding that ''in so misappropriating said trust funds 
respondent did not intend permanently to deprive said clients 
thereof," is also amply supported by the record. 
The conduct described above formed the basis of the first 
act of misconduct set forth in the notice to show cause. 
Upon the findings quoted both the local administrative com-
mittee and the Board of Governors concluded that the peti-
tioner was guilty of professional misconduct consisting of 
the violation of his duties as an attorney at law and that 
his conduct involved moral turpitude (Bus. & Prof. Code, 
§ § 6067, 6103, 6106). 
As a second act of misconduct the notice to show cause 
charged that the petitioner made a false statement under 
oath in the Superior Court of the County of Ventura. In 
a proceeding in that court for an accounting by the adminis-
tratrix of the estate of Refugio Vargas and at a time when 
the petitioner was not present in court the administratrix 
stated that the petitioner held certain funds for the estate. 
The record indicates that the administratrix apparently had 
reference to the $750 held by the petitioner for the purchase 
of the minor's interest, and that she erroneously thought the 
$750 had been paid into or on behalf of the estate. She, like 
the other members of the family, was uneducated and ignorant 
of business and legal transactions. She was not represented 
by counsel at the time of her statement. A citation was issued 
ordering the petitioner's presence at a continued hearing 
to be held on the morning of September 17, 1951. 'I' he citation 
was not served, but on that morning the petitioner informally 
learned that he should appear and he promptly did so. He 
contends that he was not fully aware of the reason he had been 
ordered to appear and that he knew only that the proceeding 
was one for an accounting of the assets, rents, issues and profits 
of an estate with which he was not connected. There ,is evi-
dence in the record of that proceeding that the petitioner's 
two clients were under the impression that the purchase of 
the property interest had been consummated. However, the 
record furnishes no basis for a reasonable belief of this nature 
and the testimony of the two clients, derived through a Mexi-
can interpreter, is conflicting and confusing. It is apparent 
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although they apparently had been kept informed of its de-
velopment. 
Under these circumstances the petitioner stated, in answer 
to inquiries by the court, that he did not have or had not had 
any money in the amount of approximately $750 that was to go 
to the representatives of a minor child for the purpose of pur-
chasing the interest of the minor in the estate of Refugio 
Vargas. He later explained to the court that it did not occur 
to him that the court had reference to money he held for 
the purchase of the minor's interest if an agreement could be 
reached and that until an agreement was reached the money 
was not held for the purchase of the minor's interest. 
[1] Although the local administrative committee and the 
Board of Governors found that the petitioner's statement was 
not true, they further found that "when respondent [peti-
tioner here] made said statement he mistakenly believed the 
Court desired to know whether respondent had in his posses-
sion, or had ever had, any funds of said estate or of said minor; 
and respondent intended by said statement to inform the 
Court that he did not have and had never had any funds 
of said estate or of said minor. That the information which 
respondent then and there intended to state to' said Court 
was true.'' This amounts to a finding of an incorrect state-
ment made without intent to deceive, and properly should be 
considered as a vindication of the misconduct charged in the 
notice to show cause in connection thereto. 
At the same hearing the petitioner made the following 
statements to the court in answer to its inquiries: 
The Court: ''Have you ever used any of this money at 
any time under any circumstances or conditions for your 
own?'' 
The Petitioner: "No. It is in a trust account fund, separate 
and apart from my own funds.'' 
The Court : ''And at all times since the date this money 
was deposited, which was on apparently the 31st day of July, 
] 948, there has been in excess of $750.00 in that trust ac-
count, is that true?" 
The Petitioner: ''That is correct.'' 
The true condition of the account during the period the 
petitioner held the $750 has been stated. The petitioner ad-
mits that the statement last recited was incorrect. He stated 
that it was made before he had an opportunity to refer to all 
of his books and records and that he had requested a con-
tinuance for this purpose. The findings state that the above 
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testimony ''was false in that said trust account had been over-
drawn four times between July 31, 1948 and September 17, 
1951 and in that said trust account had contained balances of 
less than $750.00 at numerous times between ,July 31, 1948 and 
September 17, 1951." 
The local administrative committee and the Board of 
Governors concluded that by the false statements in regard to 
the trust account the petitioner was guilty of professional 
misconduct in violation of his oath of office and his duties as 
an attorney (State Bar Act, §§ 6067, 6068(d), 6103, 6106, 
6128(a)) and that such conduct involved moral turpitude. 
From a review of the record it is evident that the peti-
tioner did what he was charged with having done. He does 
not question the findings with reference to what took place. 
He does challenge the severity of the discipline recommended 
by the Board of Governors and the sufficiency of the evidence 
to support the findings as to his state of mind in connection 
with depleting his trust account below the sum of $750, and 
in stating to the court that the account had never fallen be-
low that amount. 
The petitioner attempts to excuse his failure to maintain 
$750 in his trust account on the ground that withdrawals in 
excess of that amount were unintentional. The account should 
have shown a balance at all times of $750 plus whatever other 
trust funds were deposited therein from time to time. ·while 
he insists that no improper withdrawals were made, and that 
there is no evidence that withdrawals from the account 
were for purposes other than those for which the account was 
intended to be used, he is unable to explain why the account 
was depleted below the $750. When asked to explain the 
reason for the recurring deficiencies to the local administrative 
committee he stated, "Well, I have mulled over that and 
tried my best to figure it out. I don't know whether some 
funds of some other funds were not deposited in the proper 
account or whether-I just can't give you an answer to that 
... I honestly don't know ... I kept records but they are 
so scattered . . . I don't know-I honestly wish there was 
some way that I could discover for myself what has actually 
happened here. I honestly don't know. That is all." State-
ments of a similar nature were made to the Board of 
Governors. 
The petitioner was the only one authorized to issue checks 
on the trust account, but he suggests that the condition of 
the account may have been due to the dishonesty of employees 
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entrusted with sums of money to be deposited therein. He 
offered no evidence of the suggested dishonesty. By his own 
admission he continued to make overdrafts against the ac-
count after he was informed by the bank that the aceount 
was overdrawn. Upon notice of an overdraft he would de-
posit personal funds in the trust account but during the three 
year period he never succeeded in correcting the deficiency 
in tlle account. The last overdrawal occurred in August, 1951, 
less than a month prior to his statement in court that the 
account had never been overdrawn. 
'rhe petitioner testified that he did not employ a book-
keeping system which would show a balance of funds he held 
in trust. He never knew, then, the level at which the trust 
account should have been maintained. Following his court 
appearance on September 17, he refunded the $750 to Pilar 
Vargas and Joe Diaz. Thereafter, he states, he succeeded in 
balancing his trust account but is still unable to discover the 
reason for the deficiencies. He reported that it required 
"some $2,000" of his personal funds to balance the account. 
He admits that the condition of the account indicated that he 
had commingled other trust funds with the $750 here in 
question. 
The record shows that the petitioner was guilty of an un-
justified omission to safeguard his clients' funds. [2] It has 
been held that ''Gross negligence is a breach of the fiduciary 
relationship that binds an attorney to the most conscientious 
fidelity to the interests of his client. [Citations.] It warrants 
disciplinary action, since it is a violation of his oath to dis-
charge his duties to the best of his knowledge and ability." 
(Clark v. State Bar, 39 Cal.2d 161, 164 [246 P.2d 1]; see, also, 
Watennan v. State Bar·, 8 Cal.2d 17, 20 [63 P.2d 1133] .) 
[3] In the present case the record justifies the conclusion 
that the petitioner's conduct in overdrawing his account con-
stituted more than negligence and carelessness on his part. 
While it is true that the petitioner was called upon to 
answer the court's inquiries on short notice and without an 
opportunity to study his records, he answered unequivocally 
an(t without qualification that there had been in excess of $750 
in his trust account at all times since the deposit therein. 
He stated before the Board of Governors that at the time he 
made his answer in court he couldn't remember in what year 
the $750 bad been dey>osited in his trust account, or when 
the trust account had been overdrawn in connection with 
the deposit. The deposit had been made more than three 
Mar. 1953] LOWE v. STATE BAR 
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years previously; the last overdraft had occurred within the 
previous month and the petitioner admits that he had been 
informed on each occasion when he overdrew the account. 
The reasonable inference to be drawn from the admitted facts 
is that the petitioner knew, or was chargeable with knowledge, 
that the balance of his trust account had not been in excess 
of $750 at all time~> that the amount supposedly remained 
therein. 
[ 4] 'I' he untrue statement to the court by the petitioner 
was made in a proceeding for an accounting in the matter of 
the estate of Refugio Vargas. This proceeding had nothing 
to do with the condition of the petitioner's trust account. 
\\'hether the statement was material or immaterial to the 
inquiry before the court it nevertheless is denounced by section 
6068 (d) of the State Bar Act and constituted professional 
misconduct if made with the intention of deceiving the court. 
l t is doubtful whether it had any influence on the action of 
the court in the accounting proceeding then before it. 
[5] From the foregoing it is concluded that the record 
supports the flnding that the petitioner was guilty of profes-
sional misconduct and was properly subjected to disciplinary 
action. But under all of the circumstances disbarment ap-
pears to be out of proportion to the seriousness of the offenses 
eommitted. The ends of justice would fully be met by the 
suspension recommended by the local administrative com-
mittee. 
It is therefore ordered that the petitioner be ·suspended 
from the practice of the law in this state for the period of two 
years, this order to become effective 30 days from the filing of 
this decision. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
While I agree that petitioner was guilty of moral turpitude 
and should be disciplined for his conduct, I cannot agree 
that he should be suspended from practice for a period of two 
years. In my opinion, suspension from practice for a period 
of six months would be adequate under the facts disclosed 
by the record in this case. 
Furthermore, I do not agree with the holding in the ma-
jority opinion that gross negligence of an attorney in handling 
his client's business warrants disciplinary action. In the ab-
sence of intentional wrongdoing, I do not believe it can fairly 
be said that an attorney has been guilty of conduct involving 
moral turpitude. 
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The record here clearly discloses that petitioner was guilty 
of conduct involving moral turpitude, although he apparently 
had no intention of defrauding his client, and no loss was 
suffered as a result of his misconduct. 
Por the foregoing reasons I would suspend the petitioner 
Jr-om for a period of six months. 
[S. :F'. Nos. 18674, 18675. In Bank. Mar. 30, 1953.] 
WILLIAM HANLEY, Respondent, v. DANIEL C. MURPHY, 
Individually and as Sheriff, etc. et al., Appellants. 
[S. F. No. 18676. In Bank. Mar 30, 1953.] 
BERNARD REILI-1Y, Respondent, v. THE CITY AND 
COUNTY OF SAN Ii'RANCISCO et al., Appellants. 
[1] Municipal Corporations-Charters-Construction.-Sections of 
a municipal charter relating to the same subject must be con-
strued together, giving effect and meaning so far as possible 
to all parts thereof, with the purpose of harmonizing them and 
effectuating the legislative intention as therein expressed. 
[2] !d.-Officers and Employees-RemovaL-While charter of city 
and county of San Francisco vests in a department head broad 
power in effecting reduction of forces under his jurisdiction 
(§ 20) and the budget-making procedure accords therewith, 
the department head, in removing employees from positions in 
his department, must act in conformity with applicable civil 
service regulations. 
[3] Civil Service-Merit System.-The civil service system rests 
on the principle of application of the merit system instead of 
the spoils system in the matter of appointment and tenure of 
ofiice. 
[ 4] Municipal Corporations-Officers and Employees-RemovaL-
Although a department head of city and county of San Fran-
cisco, in the exercise of his administrative discretion under the 
charter, may effect a reduction of employees in his department 
pursuant to his judgment as to the needs of the work, "any 
other provision of this charter to the contrary notwithstand-
[2] See Cal.Jur., Municipal Corporations,§ 259; Am.Jur., Munici-
pal Corporations, § 239 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Municipal Corporations, § 78; [2, 4, 5] 
Municipal Corporations, §309; [3, 7] Civil Service, §1; [6] 
Municipal Corporations,§ 313; [8] Civil Service,§ 4; [9] Municipal 
Corporations, § 314.5. 
